Abstract-The propagation of P2P worm covers large area and causes great damage. A dynamic quarantine protocol is designed to quarantine the suspicious host in the P2P system. Then a mathematical model of PWPQ is proposed which considering the dynamic process of peer joining and leaving. The effect of dynamic quarantine on active P2P worm is analyzed. Through stability analysis for PWPQ model, a key argument of infection-free stable point which affect the P2P worm propagation, the basic reproduction number, is deduced. Simulation results show that the propagation model of P2P worms can reflect the P2P worm behaviors and the performance of our model is significantly better than other models, in terms of decreasing the number of infected hosts and reducing the worm propagation speed. When the basic reproduction number is less than 1, infection-free stable point is global stability and the P2P worm are eliminated. The PWPQ model gives some way to control P2P worm break out and gives guidelines to P2P worm detection and defense.
INTRODUCTION
Many popular peer-to-peer (P2P) systems surging recently are application-layer overlay network built on top of the Internet. The P2P overlay network consists of all the participating peers as network nodes. P2P networks are typically used for connecting nodes via largely ad hoc connections. Nodes are both suppliers and consumers of resources [1] .
Due to the intrinsic properties, P2P systems can potentially be a powerful vehicle for attackers to launch active worms and achieve rapid worm propagation in the Internet [2] . Firstly, there are a large number of homogeneous users to acquire P2P services drawing hacker's attention. Secondly, the connectivity of P2P users accelerates worm propagation because worms become more efficient in searching for targets referring to neighbor's information [3] .
The definition of P2P worm was formally proposed in 2005. P2P worm is a new network worm which living in P2P network and using the characteristics of P2P network to spread [4] . The dynamics of peer participation, or churn, are an inherent property of P2P systems and critical for design and evaluation [5] . In this paper, we tackle this issue by modeling and analyzing P2P worm propagation considering the inherent property of P2P systems and designing effective defense strategies within the P2P system to suppress worm propagation. But the heterogeneousness of P2P system is not discussed in this paper which is a future consideration. According to the different propagation way, P2P worms can be divided into passive P2P worm, reactive P2P worm and active P2P worm. Passive P2P worms camouflages themselves as shared files, waiting to be downloaded and reproduced [6] . Passive P2P worms cannot infect others without user's participation. Reactive and active P2P worms automatically propagate through vulnerabilities of peers. Reactive P2P worms infect only peers which are requesting files at that time [7] . Active P2P worm has a non-scanning feature and can make use of neighbor routing table of P2P network as attacking list to launch an attack [8] . Although there are currently only passive P2P worms in the wild such as Igloo and MyDoom, active P2P worms will prevail in the future. According to above-mentioned reasons, we emphasize particularly on the modeling and analysis of the active P2P worm propagation.
There are two types of P2P systems depending on their topology: structured P2P and unstructured P2P systems. Structured P2P systems employ a globally consistent protocol such as CAN [9] , Chord [10] and unstructured P2P systems are established arbitrarily such as Gnutella [11] , Freenet [12] . For the structured P2P systems, the topology degree is actually a constant [13] . While for the unstructured P2P systems, the topology degree is a variable and represents a scale-free property. This paper only focuses on the issues about the structured P2P systems while the research of unstructured P2P systems is a future consideration.
Many investigations prove that P2P worm is a rapid spreading worm [14] . Automatic mitigation is necessary for defending against rapid spreading worms. Current behavior-based anomaly detection methods are relied on to detect an unknown worm and different methods are proposed to decrease the false alarm rate e.g., a behaviorbased worm detection [15] , an entropy-based worm detection [16] , a rough set worm detection [17] . A dynamic quarantine model based on the principle "assumed guilty before proven innocent" is proposed by Cliff Zou in [18] . But the dynamic quarantine method has not been used in P2P worm as I known. So a detection method and a dynamic quarantine defense protocol are designed for the P2P system and we quantitatively understand the impacts of P2P worm propagation with dynamic quarantine defense.
Our contributions in this paper are threefold. First, a dynamic quarantine defense protocol is designed for the P2P system. Second, a new P2P worm model with dynamic quarantine defense is proposed called PWPQ model and the efficiency of the model is validated through the simulation. According to actual P2P systems, the peer churn property is taken into account to the PWPQ model. Third, the worm-free equilibrium point is analyzed and the important parameter, the basic reproduction number, is derived to quantify the guideline for effective P2P worm defense.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the quarantine method used in the P2P systems and a quarantine protocol is proposed for all kinds of situation of hosts. Section 3 discusses related work on worm propagation models. Section 4 proposes a new P2P worm model (PWPQ) with dynamic quarantines defense and peer churn. Section 5 discusses the existence and stability of worm-free equilibrium point, and obtains the basic reproduction number. Section 6 shows the simulation results of the proposed model as compared to other models, studies the effect of some parameters on the infected population. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the paper.
II. DYNAMIC QUARANTINE STRATEGY AND QUARANTINE PROTOCOL IN THE P2P STSTEM
Enlightened by the methods used in epidemic disease control in the real world, dynamic quarantine method is used in [18] based on the principle "assume guilty before proven innocent".
This dynamic quarantine method can alleviate the negative impact of false alarms generated by worm anomaly detection systems. Based on the principle "assume guilty before proven innocent", the dynamic quarantine method is an effective way to process and find an unknown worm. For an unknown worm, it is hard for people to let hosts immune to this kind of worm. Even for a recent known worm, the period of the exploiting the patching and the publishing period are long. It is hard to make hosts immune to worm in time. So dynamic quarantine method is an important way used in control worm break today.
There are many ways are proposed to quarantine a host in the Internet. But how to isolate a host in the P2P system, which is different from the Internet, is a question need to be solved. This paper designed a protocol that used to quarantine hosts in the P2P system.
A. Detection Method
The two major variants of intrusion detection systems have emerged, namely host and network based approaches [19] .
Network-based systems monitor packets on the wire by setting the network interface to promiscuous mode and analyzing network traffic. Therefore they have some possibilities to correlate activities that occur at different hosts, but suffer from scalability problems in case of high network load and have problems when encrypted communication is used.
Host-based systems collect local data from sources internal to a computer, usually at the OS level. This has the advantage of collecting high quality data directly at the source (e.g. kernel).
It is hard to configure the network-based intrusion detection program in the P2P system. Because for a structured P2P system, the network formed by the P2P hosts are logic and virtual network. Adjacent hosts are far away each other and not in the same network. So in the P2P system, the host-based intrusion detection program is used to dynamic quarantine defense.
B. Quarantine Method
It is assumed that the host-based worm detection program we use in the system can determine which service port has suspicious activities, then the quarantine means we only block traffic on the suspicious port without interfering normal connections on other ports. Once some hosts give alarms and are quarantined, security staffs should inspect these quarantined hosts as quickly as possible. Security staffs can recovery these hosts via patching.
But the P2P worms use the P2P application to propagate themselves and the P2P service is also blocked once the port is blocked. So the quarantined hosts need to inform their neighbors leave temporarily. The neighbors also need to identify the quarantined host. So a simple quarantine protocol is designed when hosts are in the P2P systems and run host-based worm detection program.
The dynamic quarantine method we present here can be built on any worm detection systems, where the detection systems are assumed to have certain false positive and false negative.
C. Quarantine Protocol
Quarantine protocol is an application layer protocol using UDP protocol to send data. The Quarantine protocol composed of three basic mechanisms:
Inform Neighbors Emend Routing Table  Quarantine the service port Two kinds of messages are designed for different purposes, which are I message and R message. The formats of the three messages are as following:
I message I message is used to inform a host that the host has the suspicious behavior. The format of I message is shown in Fig. 1 . Figure 1 . The format of I message SID (Source node ID) field is used in the P2P system to identify the host sending the message. DID (Destination node ID) field is used in the P2P system to identify the host receiving the message. QID field is used to identify the host who has the suspicious behavior. When QID field equals SID, it means the host with SID needs to be isolated. Otherwise, when QID field equals DID, it means that the host with DID needs to be quarantined. P2PID field is a port number which is used to identify P2P service which is blocked. START field is a timestamp to record the start time of quarantine. QTIME field is used to record the quarantine time.
R message R message is used to response a host. It is an acknowledgment message. The format of R message is shown in Fig. 2 . SID field and DID field is the same meaning as in the I message. ACK field means that the host in the P2P system has got the I message.
There will be three situations when using the quarantine protocol. Protocol 1 describes the working process of the quarantine protocol.
Protocol 1: Quarantine Protocol 1. node i is the host in the P2P system and the its neighbors' set is N 2. If node i is detected by the intrusion detection presenting a suspicious behavior While N is not empty do Select a neighbor set V from N The host sends an I message to the neighbor and wait a R message If get a R message N=N-V end while do Quarantine operation 3.If node i got an I message from his neighbor node j to inform him have a suspicious behavior node i send a R message N=N-Node j While N is not empty do Select a neighbor set V from N The host sends an I message to the neighbor and wait a R message If get a R message N=N-V end while do Quarantine operation 4.If node i has got an I message that informs him his neighbor node j is detected by the intrusion detection presenting a suspicious behavior node i send a R message The host sends an I message to the node j and wait a R message do Emend Routing Table operation 5. If the neighbor of node i has got an I message that informs him the neighbor of node j is detected by the intrusion detection presenting a suspicious behavior node i send a R message do Emend Routing Table operation (1) Once a host is detected presenting a suspicious behavior, the host will send an I message to all its neighbors and do Quarantine operation. (2) Once a host has got the message from his neighbor to inform him have a suspicious behavior. The host will send a R message to his neighbor and also send I messages to the other neighbors and do Quarantine operation. (3) Once a host has got the message that informs him his neighbor is detected by the intrusion detection presenting a suspicious behavior. The host will send a R message and also send I messages to the neighbor. Finally the host will emend the routing table of P2P systems making the neighbor's state block. (4) Once the neighbor of a node has got the message that informs him the neighbor of the other node is detected by the intrusion detection presenting a suspicious behavior. Then the node just emends the routing table of P2P systems. The quarantine protocol is based on the hosts trusting in each other. The fake, authentication and other uncertain conditions are not considered III. TRADITIONAL MODELS An accurate Internet worm propagation model can have an insight into worm behavior, identify the weakness in the worm spreading chain and provide accurate prediction for the purpose of damage assessment for a new worm threat [20] .
A. Internet Propagation models
Traditional models do not take the P2P network into account. However, the bulk of the models in P2P system are based on these traditional models. As for some typical examples of the Internet worm propagation models, the classical simple epidemic model (SEM), KermackMcKendrick (KM) model, and a dynamic quarantine model are introduced briefly here.
In the simple epidemic model [21] , all hosts stay in one of the only two states at any time: susceptible or infected as shown in Fig. 3 . The state transfers of any host only happen from susceptible to infected in case of the susceptible hosts being attacked by worm. Finally, all susceptible hosts will be infected in a finite network. Kermack-McKendrick model [22] improves the simple epidemic model via considering the removal process of the infected hosts due to patching or installing software designed to fix security vulnerabilities. Once a host is removed from the infected state, it will be immunized to that kind of worm forever. So each host belongs to one of the three states: susceptible, infected, or removed. All hosts are removed in the end in a finite network. Accordingly, each host of the KM model has the state transition susceptible→ infected→ removed as shown in Fig.4 . Simulation results show that KM model is closer to the situation of actual worm propagations. [18] , whose basic idea is "assumed guilty before proven innocent". The measure of it takes is that the host will be quarantined for a period of time T once exhibiting suspicious behavior, and then it will return to the network over again.
This model is based on two observations: (1) Using a short quarantine time will have a very minor effect on network performance, and (2) The adjustable alert rate and the ability to increase the sensitivity of detection will yield opportunities to detect more worms [23] .
All hosts in this model belong to one of the following states: susceptible, infected, quarantine, or removed as shown in Fig.5 . 
B. Evolutinal models in P2P networks
The foundations of the P2P worm propagation models are mainly evolved from the traditional worm propagation models. But the P2P worm propagation models should take the new distinguishing characteristics into account due to the feature of P2P networks.
Yu Wei et al. [24] transplanted the SEM model to P2P networks. The authors model and analyze P2P systembased active worm attacks. They set up the offline and online P2P worm model. They found that P2P-based active worm attacks can significantly enhance worm propagation speed using the neighbors' information of P2P topology. Results show that several P2P related parameters, such as system size, topology degree, host vulnerability, etc., have significant impacts on worm propagation.
Yejiang Zhang et al. [25] proposed the model of proactive P2P worm based on unstructured peer to peer network. They drew two important conclusions, on the one hand, proactive P2P worm propagations are difficult to suspend owing to a rapid propagation speed; on the other hand, worms propagate faster once starting from large-degree node than small-degree node if treating the P2P network as a graph.
IV. THE PWPQ MODEL WITH DYNAMIC QUARANTINE
A new method to combat network worm infections is proposed by considering the inherent P2P system property and adding a dynamic quarantine strategy which is called P2P Worm Propagation Quarantine (PWPQ) model.
A. Assumptions
The propagation process of P2P worm is complicate and difficult to model. The actual P2P systems are too huge to utilize and the time taken by active P2P worm to infect other hosts is a variable depending on the P2P worm size, network distance, network bandwidth and so on.
Our model is based on the following assumptions in order to solve above-mentioned problems: We assume that once a host is infected, it tries to infect all its neighbors, ignoring the effect of worm size, network distance, network bandwidth, and the time duration to infect other hosts is be set to one unit time. The P2P worm propagation is regarded as a continuous process.
The Intrusion Detection Systems can detect the port of the entire host in the P2P system. Any port on any host with suspicious behavior will be quarantined. The quarantine rates of the hosts differ depending on the host stage. Once a host is quarantined, the host will gain immunity and is no longer susceptible or infected.
B. The Stages of PWPQ propagation Model
All the hosts in the P2P systems belong to a closed space Ω represented by undirected graph denotes a host in the P2P system. The number of the hosts is denoted by N , which is a constant independent of time. The host is not connected to each other before a worm propagating. When the host is infected by the other host, there is a link between them. The PWPQ model classifies hosts as being in one of five different stages and the host stage of PWPQ propagation model is described in Fig. 6 . In a P2P worm propagating process, any host can potentially be in any of these stages at any time t :
(1) S (susceptible): All hosts in this stage are vulnerable to P2P worm infection, and can acquire the worm infection when contacting with an infected host.
(2) I (infected): All hosts in this stage has been infected by malicious P2P worms and can propagate the infection to other hosts. 
C. The stage transition of PWPQ propagation model
Initially, all hosts are in W-stage. When a host acquires the P2P service, the host will be in S-stage. Once a worm intrudes into the P2P system, these hosts may change their stages according to their own characteristics as shown in Fig. 7 . According to the features of P2P worms and the above assumption, the stage of susceptible hosts may transform in the following cases: (1) if the host can obtain immunity via patching, it will go directly into stage R. (2) if the host exhibits suspicious behaviors, it will go into stage Q. (3) if the host communicates with the infected host, it will go into stage I. (4) if the host leaves the P2P system, it will go into stage W.
For infected hosts, the stage transition will be keep to the rules as follows: (1) if the host can obtain immunity via patching, it will go directly into stage R. (2) if the host exhibits suspicious behaviors, it will be quarantined and go into stage Q. (3) if the host leaves the P2P system, it will go into stage W.
The quarantined host transition to stage R via patching or to stage W if the host leaves P2P system. If the recovery host leaves the P2P system, it will go into stage W. The waiting host will join P2P systems according to the needs of users and go into the stage S. After each waiting host joins P2P system, it will be seen as a new host and go into the stage S.
To enhance readability, Table 1 shows the notations used in this model. For any host in the P2P system, the probability of being attacked by one attack is 1 ( ) N W t − , and thus the probability of not being attacked is 1 1 ( )
.Then for any host , the probability of not being attacked by k times attacks is 1
. So the probability of being attacked by at least one of k attacks
. There are total ( ) S t hosts belonging to the susceptible population.
So for k attacks, the newly added infected hosts from the susceptible stage to the infected stage can be derived
When k=1 (one attack), there are ( ) S t susceptible hosts and total ( ) N W t − hosts at time t in the P2P system. One attack adds ( ) / ( ( )) S t N W t − newly infected hosts. Therefore for k attacks, we assume that the newly added infected hosts from the susceptible stage to the infected stage can be derived by 1
Then, the k+1th attack can be divided into two steps: the first k attacks and the last attack. For the last attack, there are two possibilities: adding a newly infected host and not adding a newly infected host. Let the probability P defined on events
The number of hosts transited from the susceptible stage to the infected stage at time t is given as follows: Thus, we have he newly added infected hosts from the susceptible stage to the infected stage can be derived
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Also, the number of hosts that transition from the infected stage to the recovery stage, wait stage and quarantined stage are ( )
respectively. Hence we can derive equation (1):
The parameters, q1 and q2, the effective quarantine probability of infected hosts and susceptible hosts, respectively, are defined in [18] as follows:
Two parameters, 1 λ and 2 λ , respectively describe the quarantine rates of infected hosts and susceptible hosts, which is related to intrusion detection system. Because of the false positive in Intrusion Detection Systems，the susceptible hosts may not be infected yet with worms but be detected and be quarantined. In this case the quarantine rate has been set to small sensitivity.
However, in infected hosts, bad worms start scanning the network for new targets. In this case, more suspicious activities should be detected, and the quarantine rate has been set to a higher level. So, in our case 1 λ is greater than 2 λ , where worm activity in the infected stage is higher than in the susceptible stages. We can base the set of differential equations of the proposed model on the same concept. The set of differential equations for PWPQ model are: 
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N is the total number of hosts which satisfies
V. MODEL ANALYSIS
The PWPQ model presented in the previous section is analyzed and the condition for the stability of the worm free equilibrium is obtained.
A. Virus Free Equilibrium
For the concision of notation, let According to epidemiology [26] , the basic reproduction number, 0 R governs the tendency of virus propagation. 0 1 R < ensures that the epidemic dies out fast and does not attain an endemic state. 
Where a i =0 when i＞n. Then, the sufficient condition that every root of Eq. (6) has the negative real is the establishment of the following inequality: a 1 ＞0,∆ 2 ＞0,∆ 3 ＞0,…,∆ n -1 ＞0,a n ＞0 Theorem 2. According to the model of propagation of P2P worms, the epidemic dies out fast and does not attain an endemic in P2P networks if and only if
Proof. The Jacobian determinant of model (5) at the worm-free equilibrium 0 ( *, *, *, *)
is, where let
(1 ) ) ( ) ln 0
The characteristic equation of model (5) at a point 0 P goes as follows:
Thus, Eq. (9) reduces to
According to Theorem 2 in [28] , the basic reproduction number of model (5) 
, the epidemic dies out fast and does not attain endemic level.
VI. SIMULATION
We represent our initial parameters of P2P system using a tuple of the form , their settings is the same as Zou [18] . Other parameters are set as follows:
0.05
Substituting the values of parameters into Eq. (5), we can obtain that the basic reproduction number 0 R is 0.4546 . From Fig. 8 , the tendency of the worm propagation is depressive, which is consistent with the theory analysis. The result shows that the quarantine strategy prolongs the time at which infected hosts reaches its peak and lower the total number of infected hosts. But because of existing small-world phenomenon in P2P system, the time the infected hosts reach the peak only has a little reduction. So, the reduction of P2P worm spread speed is still relatively small.
B. Quarantine time and quarantine rate of infected hosts
The simulation in Fig. 9 shows that our defense strategy is effective when quarantine time (T) is set to be 10. Fig. 10 shows the effect of the quarantine rate on worm propagation. As expected, the results show that the larger the quarantine time T is, the slower the worm propagates at the early stage, and the smaller the number of infected hosts is. But the quarantine time T can affect normal activities of healthy hosts due to the fact that any anomaly detection program has the false positive rate unavoidably. Thus, an appropriate quarantine time T is must to be selected to defend against worms.
C. The effect of the node degree
The simulation in Fig. 11 shows the effect of the node degree. The smaller the peer degree is, the fewer the infected population is and the slower the worm propagation speed is. The degree of P2P network determines the topology structure of P2P network. The topology structure of P2P network is a key factor of determining active P2P worm propagation and has a significance advice to establish secure P2P network.
D. The effect of basic reproduction number
The basic reproduction number 0 R governs the tendency of virus propagation. To exhibit the character of the basic reproduction number, Fig. 12 shows the propagation trend of the different basic reproduction number. As expected, the smaller basic reproduction number results in diminishing the worm propagation speed, lowering the total number of infected hosts. So the basic reproduction number can be used to control the breakout the P2P worm.
For a stable condition, no matter the initial value is, the infected hosts will die out. Fig. 13 shows the propagation trend of infected hosts with different initial number of infected hosts under a stable condition when the basic reproduction number is less than 1. As we expected, the smaller the number of initial infected hosts, the lower speed of the P2P worm propagation. But in the end the number of the infected hosts will be zero, which is a stable point. So we can conclude that the basic reproduction number is a way to control the P2P worm break out.
VII. CONCLUSION
Active P2P worms constitute a potentially deadly threat to P2P network security. This paper designs a quarantine protocol and proposes the PWPQ model based on the inherent property of P2P systems and deduced the conditions for the stability of the worm-free equilibrium. We proved that the dynamics of the PWPQ model were completely governed by the basic reproduction number 0 R . Our model showed a decline in the number of infected hosts compared with other models, as well as a decline in the propagation speed. Through analysis and simulation of the P2P worm propagation process with quarantine strategy, it reveals its spread characteristics.
Additional simulation results showed the propagation of P2P worms is mainly governed by the quarantine time, the network degree and the basic reproduction number. This can provide an important guideline in the control of rapid spreading worms.
The future work need to be done include making quarantine strategy in practice and modeling other sorts of P2P worms considering the topology aspect etc.
